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The Future of the World Economy
An Appraisal of Leontief's Study
CONTENTS:
by Jamuna P. Agarwal, Dean Spinanger, Bernd Stecher
The UN study concludes that by the end of this century a substantial reduction in the
present income gap between developed and developing countries is feasible. The resource
base for realizing the envisaged growth rates is not seen as a limiting factor; limits might
rather be imposed by the inflexibility of the international economic order as well as by
economic, social and political institutions in developing countries. Industrialization in devel-
oping countries based on heavy industries is expected to serve as the engine of growth,
the capital requirements for which are met primarily by domestic sources.
Different conclusions, however, are arrived at in this appraisal of major aspects of the UN study:
% A high concentration of productive resources in heavy industries tends to aggravate
the developing countries' problems of unemployment and balance-of-payments deficits,
since technologies involved are labor-saving, capital requirements are too high and
export chances are low.
% There is not enough empirical evidence to support the UN study's optimism that invest-
ment in heavy industries of the order of magnitude involved can be financed by
increasing domestic savings and by the inflow of foreign capital into developing
countries.
0 An industrialization strategy which aims at exploiting existing resources of developing
countries more efficiently should concentrate on labor- and /or raw material-intensive
activities. An industry-mix based on present and potential comparative advantages will
increase their international competitiveness and encourage direct investment from abroad.
% The proposition to increase the relative prices of developing countries' primary commodity
exports would neither help reduce their balance-of-payments deficits nor improve their
income position over the long run. On the contrary, it would result in a world-wide
misallocation of resources and induce resource saving in the developed countries.
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References 4gI. Introduction
1. The work of Wassily Leontief and his associates [19 77] represents the most recent attempt
to depict and forecast the world economy by applying mathematical methods, integrated into a
global model. While the authors of the "The Future of the World Economy" (hereafter re-
ferred to as FOWE) have constructed a very complex model, the fundamental question must
still be raised about the actual ability of such procedures to correctly portray the present,
situation and accurately capture future developments. An answer to this question is of consid-
erable relevance, as ever since the publication of The Limits to Growth [Meadows et al. 19 72]
there has been an increasing tendency to employ such global approaches and place a certain
degree of confidence in their results particularly for policy purposes.
2. It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to answer this question by critically analyzing
the findings and conclusions presented in FOWE
1. Although it might be assumed the logical
starting point for such an appraisal would be an extensive discussion of the methods involved
and the assumptions made, this paper purposely concentrates on the model' s results as well
as on its policy conclusions. This, however, does not mean that every comment on specific
peculiarities of the model is precluded. It means rather that criticism of methods and assump-
tions is of secondary nature and serves only to explain differences in results between FOWE
and alternative projections. This implies that no attempt has been made to offer still another
global model but instead to proceed in a partial analytical manner. Such an approach has the
advantage of not only keeping the presentation from being burdened with the technicalities of
mathematical forecasting models but it also avoids the pitfalls of passing judgement on the
model by criticizing its premises. It might be added that in this paper it is not pretended that
all issues raised in FOWE have been covered, but rather those deemed to be most relevant
and where empirical evidence to the contrary was unambiguous.
3. In appraising FOWE this study concentrates on four major aspects - interrelated but dealt
with separately - pertaining in general to the preconditions and determinants of economic growth
and in particular to the factors influencing changes in the international division of labor. The
first of these four aspects covers the resource parameters, i. e. , growth of population, the en-
dowment with mineral resources, and the supply of foodstuffs. The study then focusses on fac-
tors influencing the momentum with which the world economy will grow. Foremost in this re-
spect is the industrialization process together with the investments necessary to induce and
sustain it; it is followed by a brief discussion of the impact of pollution and abatement expen-
diture on economic development. The role that international trade can play in accelerating eco-
nomic growth is the fourth aspect. In this connection the consequences of the realization of a
New International Economic Order (NIEO) are also discussed.
The authors would like to express their sincere appreciation for helpful comments from
Juergen B. Donges and Hubertus Muller-Groeling and for the editorial help of Ulrich
Brandt and Ursula Wollesen. Thanks are also due to the other colleagues who assisted in
one way or another in preparing this manuscript and its more voluminous predecessor, a
study carried out for the German Ministry of Economics.
1 It should be pointed out that a certain amount of difficulty is encountered in trying to deter-
mine exactly what the authors of FOWE were aiming at. While in the preface it is noted that
the study deals with the impact of prospective economic issues on the economic outcome of
the Second United Nations Development Decade, the authors state in the introduction that the
basis is a study on the environmental aspects of the future world economy. In light of the
title it is assumed that the former more aptly represents the thrust of FOWE.II. A Critical Appraisal of the Results
1. The Resource Base - Human, Mineral and Nutritional
4. The overriding tenor of the global forecasts in the UN study is optimistic and as such dif-
fers noticeably from the many doomsday predictions in the past years
1. This is particularly
the case with respect to the resource base where the authors claim that no insurmountable
physical barriers to economic growth in this century exist. To those who were convinced by
the controversy caused by The Limits to Growth [Meadows et al. 1972] , etc., this might
come as a surprise; to others, that is to those who realize that in market economies forces
are embodied which - if allowed to prevail - ensure that the necessary adjustments will be
forthcoming, such a result is inherent.
5. Whether or not FOWE has definitely clarified the "Limits to Growth - Issue" is of partic-
ular relevance and needs some further examination. This is all the more necessary due to
the attention given to such forecasts as well as due to the reactions they cause, and partic-
ularly in light of the key role of the resource base in setting the input parameter framework
upon which development strategies can be based. Two specific questions need to be answered:
Are the resource forecasts of the FOWE model
2 tracking? If not, what are the possible under-
lying reasons for their errant behavior?
a. Human Resources (Population)
6. The population parameters used in FOWE are based on detailed United Nations estimates of
fertility, mortality, age structure, urbanization and other basic factors underlying and deter-
mining population dynamics and are not merely the result of an exponential growth process
3 .
Until recently such UN population projections have suffered from a tendency to underestimate
and thus were subjected to constant upward revisions
4 . Although it cannot be doubted that the
methods used to forecast population developments have become more sophisticated over the
years and the data base more accurate, they still suffer from their inability to predict shifts
in demographic developments
5 . It is therefore not surprising that the recent, unexpected slow-
1 For a review and analysis of world models see S. Cole [1977] ; Clark, S. Cole [1975] . - For
a to-the-point but cynical view of the "doomsdayists" see Beckermann [1974] .
2 The global input-output model used in FOWE was disaggregated geographically into 15 regions
and sectorally into 45 sectors. It might be noted that a number of crucial questions concern-
ing the geographical classification used in FOWE remain unanswered, for instance, what de-
termined the cut-off income levels between low, medium and high-income regions? Why is
Israel included in low-income arid Africa? What is the reason for including budding devel-
oped countries like Hong Kong and Singapore in low-income Asia? Why is Greenland included
•in both North America and Europe (high income) but Taiwan, Cameroon and Guinea left out
entirely?
3 Although the UN method differs from Meadows' [in Meadows et al. 19 72] , the estimated
world population in 2000 is roughly the same.
4 For example, the 1951 estimate for total world population in 1980 (3.28 billion) had been
increased to 4.46 billion by 1968 - an error amounting to over 36 %.
5 An excellent case in point is the experience made in the United States during the last ten
years: By 1975 the predicted population (highest estimate) for 2000 had been reduced (with
respect to the 1966 estimate) by 74 million to 287 million - a downward revision of about
20 % in less than 10 years. The reason for this downward shift was a large drop in the birth
rate (-38 % from 1960-1975) [U.S. Department of Commerce 1976, Tables 3 and 8] . - It is
interesting, for instance, to note what Woytinsky wrote in 1953 that the future growth of
popula'tion will be stabilized at about 4 billion by the end of the century, with "a new cycle
of growth or decline, or [the process of depopulation] might continue until the human race
is extinct" [Woytinsky, Woytinsky 1953, p. 262].down in birth rates has caused the latest UN population estimates to show a noticeable down-
ward revision in population forecasts; i.e., the estimates for 1980 have been reduced by
83 million (about 1.5%). An important factor in this development has been the introduction
of effective family planning programs in developing countries - those countries with such
programs showed a sizeable decrease in the population growth rate [George Washington
University 19 76] . A comparison of the population estimates used in FOWE and the most
recent UN figures reveals that FOWE' s estimates are above current forecasts (albeit
only marginally). Although it is still too early to determine to what extent the population data
used in FOWE are really running errant, current trends in birth rates (together with other
factors) would seem to be indicating that FOWE' s estimates are probably upper limits [see,
e.g., Tabah 1977] . The influence of such a downward shift in the rate of population growth
1
on demand for resources, particularly in the developing countries, is an aspect which un-
fortunately was not given due emphasis in FOWE.
b. Mineral Resources
7. Beginning with exogenous estimates of income levels and after having determined the pro-
duction
2 as well as the consumption structure, the regional resource production and consump-
tion of minerals were calculated for the respective years [pp. 44-46]
 3. These figures were
then compared with conservative estimates of potential resource supply (from the U.S. Bureau
of Mines) to determine whether supply is adequate. Since the initial estimates proved to be
"too pessimistic", new estimates of potential reserves for certain minerals were produced by
multiplying the original reserve figure with a "reserve expander"factor, besides allowing for
relative price rises (so as to decrease demand)
4. These "new" reserves were then distributed
to areas assumed most likely to have such potential supplies. Despite such supply and de-
mand adjustments it was established that the demand for lead and zinc would have exceeded
the supply by the 1990s. In order to take this into account it was merely assumed that all inter-
regional trade in these two commodities would have stopped after 1990, and that all those coun-
tries without'any indigenous supplies would have found substitutes for these commodities by
then. As far as the other commodities specifically included in FOWE are concerned no short-
ages were encountered - at least not on a global level.
8. Although there can be no question about the applicability of using input-output techniques
5
1 A reduction to the UN low variant would mean about 600 mill, persons less by the year 2000.
2 The production structure and the input-output coefficients were calculated as a function of per
capita gross national product on the basis of cross-country regressions. While it might be as-
sumed that a representative sample of countries covering the full development spectrum would
be used for such calculations, this was not the case and the actual regressions included only
eight countries, not representative of the full spectrum. To begin with this reference to eight
countries is somewhat confusing since the source from which it is drawn includes ten coun-
tries [see Kravis et al. 19 75] . More important, however, the countries in the sample are
clustered at the top of the income ladder (6 high-income countries) and at the bottom (3 very
low-income countries). Granted, the extent to which this clustering distorted the results could
not be determined, it can nevertheless not be ruled out as a possible underlying explanation
for forecasts which seem to be "out of the ballpark". ^
3 Hereafter references to specific pages in FOWE are generally made with page number(s) in [ ] .
4 Leontief et al. [1977, p. 44] . - The following factors were used and applied to the known
reserves in the base year: copper 2.5; lead 1.5; nickel 2.0; zinc 1.2.
5 It would seem appropriate to recall at this point three important assumptions underlying the
input-output analysis. First of all the shares of all primary factor and intermediate inputs
are fixed and are unaffected by relative price changes, implicitly assuming that no substitution
takes place. Secondly it is assumed that production capacities are optimally utilized in order
to fulfill the condition that a given change in income is always met by the same amount and
structure of inputs. Thirdly each sector produces a single good or a number of closely re-
lated goods, whereby the share of each of these goods as well as the structure of the inputs
must remain constant. For a discussion of input-output analysis see Friedman [1955]; Taylor
[1975].to determine the amount of commodity input needed for a given change in output, an extension
over a thirty year period - even after adjusting the technical coefficients for changing income
levels - is bound to produce estimates heavily biased by today' s technology. The authors of
FOWE (knowing this to be the case) attempted to make the necessary adjustments in their mod-
el by "correcting" the technical I-O coefficients for possible changes in resource use due to
future technologies. Likewise the raw inputs of each commodity per unit output were scaled
down each decade to take account of increased recycling, which was assumed to reach a
maximum potential by 2000 [p. 45]'.
9. It must, however, be questioned whether such attempts will adequately represent the real
potential, since (aside from other factors) relative prices are not given free reign to
- increase supply by inducing more exploration and/or improved mining and production methods
2
and
- shift demand to substitutes and/or cause commodities to be consumed (produced) with a great-
er degree of efficiency.
10. On the supply side of the issue it must be pointed out that the term "reserves" used in
FOWE refers to "that portion of the identified resource from which a usable mineral or energy
commodity can be economically and legally extracted at the time of determination" [U. S. Bureau
of Mines 1976, p. 16] . A glance at the Diagram in the Appendix shows that the word "reserve"
in this context is the most limited definition possible, and represents only a small fraction of
what really exists and could be mined if prices and/or technology changed accordingly. The ex-
tent to which the market has been capable of adjusting in the past is underlined in Table 1 -
despite an exponential increase in consumption, the ratio of reserves to consumption (= pro-
duction) has increased in most cases
3 .



















Source: Own calculations based on the following: UN [1973, p. 4, Add. 2] . - Tilton [19 77,
p. 10] . - U. S. Bureau of Mines [Commodity Data Summaries 1977] . - Metallge-
sellschaft AG [19 77, .pp. 56-59].
Looking at the situation in another way, if the known reserves existing in 1948 had been con-
sumed at the rate which actually prevailed after 1948 (for comparison' s sake 1948 rate also
applied) then all commodity reserves would have been depleted by now or 19 79 (see Table 2).
This, of course, is not the case and by the "year of depletion" (in col. 3) the time horizon
had (or would have) been pushed ahead and now another "year of depletion" exists (col. 5);
in three cases the estimated life span was either longer than or just as long as before
4 .
1 The maximum potential was assumed to be less than 55 %.
2 For a well-documented and interesting description of future potential supplies of certain
commodities see Radetzki [19 77] .
3 For additional evidence see Liebrucks [19 76] .
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Reserves assumed to refer to 1948. - 1948 reserves divided by 1948 production and 1948
reserves depleted by prevailing production rates. The number in ( ) is the life span. -
cBased on production in year in (3). - Reserves in 19 76.
Source : Own calculations based on sources in Table 1.
11. It is of particular importance to stress the fact that the market forces must be allowed to
prevail (as the authors of FOWE did not) if an adequate supply of mineral resources is to be
forthcoming in the future. An excellent example of a future area, in which it must be assumed
that the market can work, is the "mining" of undersea nodules
1. However, at the moment a
potential threat to the market forces can be seen in the proposals currently discussed at the
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference to place such ocean mining activities (outside ter-
ritorial boundaries)under the control of an international organization, which is to restrict the
access to the seabed. While the intent of such proposals - both to distribute the rewards of the
oceans equitably among all nations and to prevent the terms of trade of primary producing de-
veloping countries from deteriorating - has been agreed upon in principle, an agreement on
the modus vivendi (for instance auctioning off the extraction rights vs. permanent control on
access) has yet to be reached and - as a matter of fact - is not even in sight [see Ishimine
1977; Cooper 1975] . It must be stressed that an unimpeded exploitation of the minerals from
the seabed (taking into account ecological constraints) would serve the needs of the world econ-
omy in terms of resource availability best, for it would lead to more competition (within min-
eral industries) and would generate less scarcity than in the case of restricted access.
12. In turning to the demand side of the issue it can be shown that in the past changes in rela-
tive prices have exerted a significant influence on demand patterns of natural resources. Of
particular interest in this respect is the case of the structure of demand for energy in the
United States. As can be seen from Table 3, the demand for the three major competitors for
1 In the case of copper, for instance, it is estimated that reserves would be increased by al-
most 100 % when such an undertaking becomes feasible [U. S. Bureau of Mines 1977, p. 47] .
The authors of FOWE acknowledge the fact that they did not include such known but "unre-















a 19 74 -19 75 Percentage change for the period 1950 to ( 5 ).
Source : Own calculations based on data in U.S. Department of Commerce [1976, various
tables] .
directly heating private homes - or buildings in general - (natural gas, heating oil and coal)
1
increased the most where prices rose the least
2 .
13. Another relevant case where changes in demand have a noticeable impact on the consump-
tion of commodities is offered by FOWE' s own estimates on lead - one of the metals expected
to be exhausted by the end of the century. A glance at the following Diagram, in which FOWE's
estimates are compared with three time-trends, prompts a certain amount of skepticism with
regard to the validity of the future trends estimated in FOWE. Although the diagram is not
meant to create the impression that past trends will continue far into the future, the break in
the trend, i.e. , the difference between the new consumption (production) path and the old one,
is too large not to be subjected to further scrutiny. Upon investigating the possible reasons for
this development it can be determined that particularly the increased use of low-leaded gaso-
line - in accordance with stronger antipollution legislation - (as well as the substitution of plas-
tic materials for lead in sanitary piping) lies behind the shift. Aside from underlining the im-
possibility of predicting such unexpected changes, as well as invalidating the forecast that lead
demand will exceed supply by the 1990's, this sizeable downward shift in the demand for lead
produces positive feedbacks with respect to the environment. Such a positive feedback would
seem to substantiate the contention that attempting to depict future problems based on today's
technology is virtually impossible and is surely something that cannot be achieved by adjusting
the I-O coefficients to account for technical progress.
14. In light of the forecast for lead consumption (production) running errant, a check of some
of the other commodities - to find out if the estimates are tracking (using the latest data) - and
a comparison with estimates made elsewhere as well as with "naive" estimates (merely based
on the extrapolation of three different past trends - see appendix for summary of the regres-
sions) was made. These calculations (shown in Table 4) reveal that
- the actual rate of production in 19 75 lies below the forecasted rate for all minerals, due es-
sentially to the sluggish economic growth rates in past years;
1 It is realized that coal has certain disadvantages (it is dirty and requires removal of ashes)
and is thus not a perfect substitute for oil and gas. This merely means, however, that the
price of coal relative to the other energy sources would have to have decreased all the more.
2 The U. S. Government during this period regulated both the oil price and the natural gas price.
Both were controlled to such an extent that demand expanded to the point where the supply was
no longer able to keep pace (as evidenced in the past winters by regional shortages). As a mat-
ter of fact the price was kept so low that in the last years domestic exploration virtually
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sq. ] . - Potential reserves reflect the quantity of commod-
ity in earth' s crust. It is based on calculations in
multiplied by the weight of the earth
1 s crust [see
taken from Leontief et al. [1977, Scenario A, p.
polating between 1970 and 1980. -
 dThe
figures (average of 1974-1976). -
 eMFP
which the elemental abundance
Lee, Yao 19 70] . - The values
in grams/ tons is
for FOWE were
107]; the figure for 1975 was calculated by inter-
FOWE (rev. was calculatec on the basis of actual 1975
19 70 taken from U. S. Bureau of Mines [Mineral Facts and
Problems 1971, pp. 433-434] . - Estimates taken
taken from U.S. Bureau of Mines [Mineral Facts
semi-log trend estimated for period 1912-1976. -
period 1957-1976.
from Malenbaum et al. [1973].
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Extrapolation of
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period 1967-1976. - 1 000 tons.11
- in all cases except bauxite FOWE' s estimates exceed those made elsewhere, in the case of
lead, for instance, by over 100 % and about 50 % for zinc;
- the naive projections produce values which in three cases (copper, lead and zinc) coincided
roughly with other estimates and generally decreased over the last two time periods. Only
in the case of copper did the growth rate increase significantly for the three time periods
estimated;
- using a broad definition of potential resources the cumulative demand over the 25 year peri-
od 1975-2000 is shown to be but a minute part of the potential resource base.
15. In addition to these global commodity comparisons the regional demand for certain com-
modities was examined in order to determine whether the projected regional intensity of com-
modity use roughly coincides with well-known intensity of use patterns
1. After calculating the
intensity of use for three commodities (aluminium, copper and iron) for 19 70 and 2000 (from
the data available in FOWE) and comparing them with per capita income levels, a certain
amount of difficulty arises in attempting to establish the "expected" intensity-of-use patterns
(Table 5):
Table 5 - Per Capita Income and Intensity of Resource Use




























































































































































Source : Own calculations based on Leontief et al. [1977, Annex VI, Scenario X] .
Intensity of use is a ratio of the consumption of a given commodity to GNP. Generally speak-
ing as an economy develops the intensity to which a commodity is used first increases and
then - at a certain income level - begins to decrease as technology permits a more efficient
utilization and substitutes are introduced. This is the case for both copper and iron; they
exhibit the tendency to decline somewhere around a per capita income level of U. S. $ 2 000.
Aluminium (bauxite), however, because of its wide range of properties, tends to show a con-
tinual, although slower, increase above a given income level.
In the following "dollar ($)" is used for U. S. $.12
- there would seem to be little justification for the large decrease in the intensity of copper
use in Oceania, while Japan on the other hand shows a considerable increase;
- the high-income regions' intensity of iron ore use would seem to remain at an overly high
level, while for several low-income regions the usage shows a surprising drop;
- the intensity-of-use pattern for aluminium, although more consistent with a priori expecta-
tions, exhibits an incomprehensible figure (19 70) for Africa (tropical) and an unexpected
drop for North America and Africa.
16. In closing this discussion on mineral resources it seems that little can be added to the
conclusion drawn at the Tokyo Tripartite Conference in 19 74 which stated that the possibility
of actual global shortages (due to depletion of the resource base) in this century is out of the
question. This, of course, does not mean - as the authors of FOWE also point out - that struc-
tural adjustment problems and regional shortages will not occur - as a matter of fact the dif-
ficulties that must be overcome by those developing countries which have few natural re-
sources and a rapidly expanding population present a grave challenge to the world economic
system [Weltrohstoffversorgung, 19 74] .
c. Nutritional Resources
17. The authors of FOWE were well aware of the crucial role that nutritional resources as-
sume in the world economy and accordingly incorporated a considerable amount of detail into
this sector of their model
1. They included four sectors of specific agricultural outputs (animal
products, high protein crops, grains and roots) as well as one residual sector, and also fo-
cussed their attention on the land and yield requirements necessary to fulfill the hypothesized
demand patterns evolving from changing income levels and increased population. Likewise per
capita consumption levels of proteins and calories, essential for drawing conclusions on mini-
mum nutritional levels, are also estimated
2 .
18. As mentioned earlier the structure of demand, i.e., consumption patterns (in this case)
of nutritional resources, was estimated by cross-sectional analysis (based on the ten countries
in the Kravis et al. [1975] study), in which per capita income was the independent variable.
While the projections of these patterns for each of the three years were estimated basically
by adjusting for changes in income levels, they were also made to conform to constraints based
on the results of regressions relating caloric intake to per capita income levels
3 .
19. On the supply side agricultural output was assumed to rise by an amount necessary to rough-
ly maintain the 19 70 level of regional self-sufficiency
4 . This implies, of course, that in those
regions where population and/or income levels increase the most, the increase in output is the
greatest. Once this domestic output was calculated, the increase (over the prior period) was
then attributed to changes in the amount of arable land (based on FAO data on potential arable
land) and changes in the land productivity (the "green revolution" in the widest sense of the
word). As can be seen in Table 6 the change in output necessary to fulfill the conditions in the
1 It should be mentioned that some of the growth rates shown in the summary [p. 4] are incor-
rect. For instance: a 5 % annual growth rate is equivalent to a 3. 3-fold increase in 30 years
and not 4. 3-fold.
2 Pollutants (pesticides but not fertilizer solid wastes) are also included in FOWE, but not dealt
with in this section.
3 Since projected per capita income levels (for the years 19 80, 1990 and 2000) in many cases ex-
ceeded the highest level in the base year a modification of the consumption patterns for these
regions had to be introduced. This was done by incorporating estimates of high-income con-
sumption patterns from the 1960 Consumer Expenditure Survey in the United States.
4 It was assumed that a 4 % rate of annual growth of agricultural production was consistent with
a GDP growth rate of 6 %. Assuming a higher growth rate for LDCs (7 %) the necessary aver-
age annual increase in agricultural production would have to be about 5 %.13
Bibliothek des Institute
fiir Weltwirtsdiaft Kiel
Table 6 - Agricultural Demand and Supply Indicators: 2000 Compared with 1970 (Scenario X)


















































































































































Sou rce : Leontief et al. [1977, p. 40 (for columns 3-6) and Annex VI, Scenario X (for
columns 1, 2 and 7)] . - Own calculations.
basic scenario (particularly in the lower-income countries) is quite massive and to achieve
such a forecast a very sizeable increase in land productivity has to be realized
1. Should such
increases in productivity not be forthcoming, the land/yield index reveals the area that would
have to be turned into arable land if (assuming equal yields) the same output were to be reach-
ed.
20. An interesting point (in FOWE) was made in attempting to estimate the impact of attaining
self-sufficiency for low-income Asia: In this case the redirection of investments into agricul-
ture would seem to produce economically profitable results, as the investment costs are nom-
inal and the increased expenditure for imported fertilizers and pesticides do not outweigh the
large drop in imported foodstuffs [p. 41] . The results of this calculation cause the authors of
FOWE to suggest "that self-sufficiency in food is a promising kind of 'import substitution' for
reducing balance-of-payments deficits in developing countries"
2 .
1 Figures on the investment cost of increasing the amount of arable land and/or increasing
productivity are not given in the FOWE study.
2 Leontief et al. [1977, p. 41] . - In closing their chapter on nutritional resources two specific
foodstuffs (grains and animal products) are briefly examined for developed and developing
regions. It is pointed out that in the case of grains the gap between the various levels of
grain consumption in the different regions decreases, but - due to increased meat products14
21. Despite the attempt of the FOWE authors to include many relevant details in examining the
future supply of and demand for nutritional resources, their approach in general creates a some-
what mechanical impression, and does not meet the expectations raised in their introductory re-
marks on the critical role and importance of agriculture. As unfortunate as this shortcoming
is, it should be realized that this mechanical impression should not actually be surprising,
since it can be considered to be the inherent result of the model itself. For instance, the ap-
plying of fixed 1970 shares of exports in all world exports or imports in domestic consumption
(of a given commodity) allows no room for the impact of a possible, more efficient integration
of countries producing agricultural products into the world economy within the framework of a
reordering of the world economy.
22. As a matter of fact nutritional resources in particular lend themselves to a market-
oriented approach evolving out of a more efficient division of labor in the world, since such
products are a prime example of Ricardo type goods, i.e., goods whose production is deter-
mined primarily by the endowment with particular natural resources. While specialization in
the production of such goods can be construed as meaning that the production structure of .many
developing countries should be limited to products with a low-income elasticity of demand, it
would be incorrect to conclude (aside from being only one aspect of the issue) that such a spe-
cialization would not help in achieving the goal of reducing income disparities between develop-
ing and developed countries. First of all, to the extent that developing countries can increase
their share of world trade and output (as production is shifted from DCs to LDCs) the lower in-
come elasticity of demand is outweighed
1. Secondly, even when a further increase in these
shares is not possible, the extension of mere food production to food processing and diversifica-
tion - complemented by the necessary rural development programs - helps to achieve an adequate
rate of growth and at the same time reduces the terms of trade between urban and rural areas
by expanding employment and increasing income in rural areas. Thus an additional problem
- the urban overcrowding, the severe diseconomies resulting therefrom and the concomitant
misallocation of public infrastructure investments - is also mitigated to a large degree. That
there is adequate potential to allow such an integrated and wide sweeping strategy to be achieved
can be seen in Table 7 coupled with the knowledge that
- hybrid strains and the accompanying technology are far from being used extensively in all
LDCs [cf. , e.g., Banerji 1971]; '
- land reform, as (among other things) a means of ensuring a more intensive use of arable
land, has been applied only to an insignificant degree, although its positive impact - under
certain conditions and within the framework of an integrated development strategy - is well
substantiated [cf., e.g., Fiqueroa 19 77];
- the potentials of double cropping have hardly been tapped [OECD 1976, p. 211] .
23. Knowing that the above-mentioned integration and development potential with respect to
nutritional resources is available, it would seem to be a somewhat useless computational
exercise to show the success of concentrating on increasing domestic agricultural production
with the mere goal of reducing trade deficits. To draw such general conclusions (labeled "a
kind of import substitution" by FOWE [p. 41] ) neglects the specific comparative advantages a
region might have in the production of nutritional resources and reinforces the omni-present
tendency to become self-sufficient at any cost. The result of such a policy is a misallocation
of scarce resources and a lower growth path. To avoid such mistakes FOWE should have
pointed out that only in those cases where regions possess the necessary potential should
such policies be followed. In any case the inward-oriented slant, which might be necessary
consumption in the higher-income countries - the characteristic differentials still remain
in 2000. For a regional breakdown of commodity production, consumption and net exports
see Appendix.
The extent to which the various regions of the world have been able to increase production
(and yields) in the past - as compared with their population changes - can be seen in the
Appendix.15
Table 7 - Land Utilization in the World by Regions, 1961-1965, 1975 (percent)
Region
World
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Developed Countries
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
North America
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Western Europe
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Oceania
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Developing Countries
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Africa
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Latin America
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Near East
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Far East
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Centrally planned
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Asian
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture
Europe, USSR
Arable land and permanent crops
Permanent pasture




















































































Source : FAO [various issues] . - Own calculations.16
for a given period of time, should not prevail in the long run over an outward-looking ap-
proach, if an efficient international division of labor is to be achieved. Needless to say, the
best-conceived strategy is worthless if the manifold barriers of political, social and insti-
tutional nature are not eliminated. Although the authors of FOWE also underline in their sum-
mary the necessity of overcoming these barriers [pp. 10-11], in the chapter on nutritional re-
sources - one appropriate place to be more specific in this respect - no mention is made at
all.
2. Investment and Industrialization
24. In order to achieve the rates of growth of GDP specified in the central scenario (X) the
ratio of investment to GDP would have to be nearly doubled in Africa and Asia, trebled in
Latin America and quadrupled in Middle East between 19 70 and 2000. The investment ratios
in developing countries in the year 2000 would thus generally exceed those prevailing in de-
veloped countries - a complete reverse of the base year (1970). The main burden of this rise
in investment levels in UN projection would be borne in most of the developing countries by
the ratio of private consumption to GDP since the authors of FOWE assume that the ratios of
government consumption to GDP and of net long-term capital inflow to fixed investment in
these regions would remain constant and that of net aid inflow to fixed investment would even
decrease (Table 8).
The first question which arises is why the study assumes the share of government expenditure
in GDP in developing and developed countries to be equal in the benchmark year 19 70, and
throughout the time frame of the forecasts, whereas on the one hand the share of government
expenditure in GNP in 1970 (18 %) may come near to 1970 figures for developed countries, it
is grossly overstated for most of the developing countries, especially for those at the lower
level of per capita GDP [see UNCTAD 1976, pp. 346-359] . On the other hand the empirical
evidence, which shows that the demand for government services is elastic with respect to in-
come, does not seem to justify a constant government share in rising GDP.
25. Concerning the inflow of net long-term foreign capital it is shown in FOWE that substantial
changes in the direction and volume of long-term capital would have to take place in the thirty
years following 19 70, if the projected rates of growth of GDP in different regions are to be
realized
1. Among the developing countries those which are richly endowed with resources
would be able to import as well as export long-term capital at an above average rate
2 . Devel-
oped countries would continue to remain the net suppliers of long-term capital to developing
countries
3 (Table 9).
26. Although the world pool of economic aid (as defined in FOWE) will increase from $ 27 bil-
lion in 19 70 to $ 114 billion in 2000, its net volume is only expected to rise from $ 8 billion to.
$ 22 billion. The resource-rich developing countries are seen as contributing about two thirds
of the total net economic aid, thus exhibiting a swing from a position of net receivers of aid in
1970 to a position of net suppliers of aid in 2000. The importance of the inflow of economic aid,
i.e. , the ratio of net aid to fixed domestic investment, will drop considerably also in the case
of the resource-poor developing countries (Table 9).
1 FOWE presumes that the annual volume of long-term capital movement will increase from
$ 27 billion in 1970 to $ 211 billion in 2000. Developed countries accounted for 81 % of the
long-term capital inflow and 91 % of its outflow in 1970. By the year 2000 these shares will
drop to 43 and 77 %, respectively.
2 About a 100 % increase is envisaged in the share of resource-poor developing countries in
the total inflow of long-term capital by 2000.
3 The annual net flow of long-term capital from developed to developing countries will have to
increase from $2.5 billion in 1970 to $ 72. 2 billion in 2000 in order to meet their invest-
ment requirements estimated in FOWE.17
Table 8 - GDP Growth and Shares of Consumption (C) and Investment (I) in GDP, Ratios of
Net Long-Term Capital and Net Aid to Domestic Fixed Investment in 15 Regions,
















































































































In many cases the growth rates calculated here from the
from those quoted in the scenario analysis of this study,





































































































annex tables of the UN study differ
The reasons for these differences
Source: Calculated from: Leontief et al [1977, Annex VI, pp. 86-105].18
Table 9 - GDP Growth and Shares of Personal Consumption and Fixed Investment in GDP,
Flow of Long-Term Capital and Aid in Three Groups of Developed and Develop-


































































































































































Source: Calculated from: Leontief et al. [1977, Annex VI, pp. 86-105].
2 7. From the projections for both net long-term foreign capital and net foreign aid
1 it can be
concluded that for financing the investment of the order of magnitudes involved in the FOWE
developing countries would have to depend largely and more than in the past on domestic re-
sources. The domestic resources can be made available for this purpose only when a rising
1 Taken together they will amount to 8 % of domestic fixed investment in the year 2000 in re-
source-poor developing countries and to 9 % in resource-rich developing countries compared
with 21 and 2 7 %, respectively, in 19 70.19
proportion of increasing income levels is devoted to investment at the expense of personal
consumption. As pointed out in FOWE this would "necessitate relevant measures of taxation,
credit and fiscal stimulation of savings, as well as certain institutional changes, facilitating
the accumulation of resources for investment and directing them into those areas essential
for development" [p. 34] . What FOWE does not include, however, is a specification of these
required institutional, monetary and fiscal measures.
28. Most of the total investment in developing regions is directed into the industrial sector
which has to serve as an engine of the economic growth projected in the FOWE model. Growth
of output in the manufacturing sector is expected to be higher than in the primary sector (agri-
culture and mineral resources) in all developing regions. The services sector including trans-
portation and communication shows, however, a differentiated rate of growth: whereas is grows
faster than all other sectors in Asia and Africa it lags behind the manufacturing sector in
Latin America and the Middle East (Table 10).
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Source: Leontief et al. [1977, pp. 35 sq.
29. Within the industrial sector the leading role is assigned to capital goods industries. They
are to grow faster than consumer goods industries in all the six developing regions and faster
than industries producing intermediate goods in Latin America, Asia and tropical Africa. It
is stated in FOWE that: "on the regional, though not necessarily on the country level, an ac-
cent on heavy industry is essential for industrialization and economic development. There is
special need for priority investment in the growth of machinery- and equipment-producing
branches of industry, where faster development is expected" [p. 3 6] .
30. The industrialization process underlying the FOWE model will obviously lead to consider-
able structural changes in developing regions. By the year 2000 the primary sector will lose
its dominating position either to manufacturing or to the services sector in all the developing
regions except tropical Africa (Table 11). Within the manufacturing sector the shares of cap-
ital and intermediate goods industries will rise at the expense of consumer goods industries,20
































































































































Food products, textile and apparel, furniture and fixtures, paper, printing and 'other manufactures' . -
Motor vehicles, aircraft, other transportation equipment, metal products, machinery, electrical machin-
ery and instruments. - Petroleum refinery, primary metals, wood and cork, rubber, industrial chemicals,
fertilizers, other chemicals, cement and glass.
Source: Leontief et al. [19 77, p. 35 sq. ] .
and by the end of this century far exceed the share of consumer goods sector in total indus-
trial output in all the developing regions except arid Africa. In the view of the FOWE authors
the developing countries would be following nearly the same development pattern as the de-
veloped countries [p. 35] in their initial stages of development.
31. As a result of the projected rapid industrial growth developing countries are likely to
raise their share in world manufacturing output from 6 % (1970) to 17. 5 % (2000) as com-
pared with an increase to 25 % stipulated in the UNIDO
1 s Lima Declaration; for the central-
ly planned countries an increase from 22 % (1970) to 29 % (2000) is envisaged
1. Among the
developing countries the biggest gain in this respect would be recorded by Asia and the Mid-
dle East and, sectorally speaking, by capital and intermediate goods industries [p. 3 7] .
32. Keeping these developments in mind the question arises as to what extent the FOWE strat-
egy for LDC industrialization, with emphasis on heavy industries, will
- help equalize income distribution within LDCs,
- mitigate the problems of persistent unemployment and underemployment,
- induce a fuller use of comparative advantages, both static and dynamic, and
- solve the problem of balance-of-payments constraints in resource-poor developing coun-
tries.
As to the income distribution issue, the authors merely state that special measures will have
to be taken "to facilitate a more equal distribution of income ... so that the benefits of faster
1 The corresponding world share of developed market-economy countries decreases from 70 %
to 49 %.21
growth of per capita income are shared fully, as a matter of priority by the poorest groups in
these countries" [p. 35] . It must be doubted, however, whether the heavy-industry oriented
development policy proposed in FOWE will serve the authors' purpose in this respect. As a
matter of fact past experience shows that such a policy may even counteract attempts to
achieve a more equal distribution of income. First of all, heavy industries have tended to be
located in urban areas in the LDCs (in order to profit from agglomeration economies)thereby
further shifting the terms of trade between urban and rural areas in favor of the former. Not
only do the poorer population cohorts (in the rural areas) suffer, but the urban areas also be-
come burdened with migrants hoping to find a job in such industries - an almost hopeless task
since the industries are capital intensive and only relatively few jobs are available. A devel-
opment strategy which promotes light industries on the basis of a balanced regional disper-
sion, would be more effective in facilitating an equal distribution of income. Secondly, the
promotion of light industries will contribute to the supply of consumer goods to satisfy the
additional demand for wage goods resulting from rising incomes. Compared with this, the
strategy proposed in FOWE is likely to lead to inflation given the balance-of-payments con-
straint which may prevent the LDCs from satisfying additional demand for wage goods via im-
ports. If an income distribution variable had been incorporated in the FOWE model, it is quite
likely that the tendency of its underlying development strategy to aggravate the inequality of
income distribution in LDCs would have become evident.
33. An attack on the problem of income inequality in developing countries presupposes a solu-
tion to their problem of unemployment. Rough estimates of total unemployment (including un-
deremployment and disguised unemployment) approach 20-25 % of the labor force. Measures
to increase the income of the labor force without integrating it into the active economy through
employment are very difficult to be implemented, especially in the absence of a well function-
ing social security system in these countries.
Although FOWE does show that the development strategy involved in its model leads to an in-
crease in employment in absolute number as well as in terms of the ratio of employed labor
force to total population, it does not include any estimates of the labor force so that no con-
clusions can be drawn with regard to the rate of unemployment in any of the developed or de-
veloping regions.
34. A solution to the unemployment problems in LDCs can be expected to arise from a devel-
opment strategy based on comparative advantages. A suitable industry mix in the sense of an
optimal allocation of resources can be achieved if the country concerned chooses to specialize
in those industries in which it is likely to have comparative advantages in its trade with other
countries [see Fels 1972] . An analysis of comparative advantages as revealed by the foreign
trade figures of developing countries for the years 19 70, 19 71 and 19 72 shows that they had
these advantages primarily in consumer goods
1 (Table 12). It should be emphasized, however,
that it is also necessary to distinguish between resource-rich and resource-poor developing
countries in prescribing a development strategy based on comparative advantages. Whereas
a heavy-industry oriented industrialization may be successful in the former with regard to
both growth of income as well as achievement of fuller employment, it is not likely to bear
enough fruits in these respects in the resource-poor countries owing to the balance-of-pay-
ments bottleneck faced by them.
These are: essential oils and perfume materials (SITC 55), leather and leather goods (SITC 61),
wood and cork manufactures (SITC 63), textiles (SITC 65), nonmetallic mineral manufactures
(SITC 66), furniture (SITC 81), travel goods (SITC 82), clothing (SITC 84), footwear (SITC 85)
and miscellaneous articles like musical instruments (SITC 89). Their comparative advantage
in mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 52) is ac-
counted for mainly by those of developing countries which are rich in these resources. Stud-
ies at a more disaggregated level reveal a few exceptions, e.g., India in metal manufactures
(SITC 69). See Donges, Riedel [1977] ; Agarwal, Rodemer [1977, Annex Tables] .22
Table 12 - Revealed Comparative Advantages (+) and Disadvantages (-) of Developing Coun-
tries in their World Trade, 19 70-1972
a
Commodity group according to SITC
51 Chemical elements and compounds
52 Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum
and natural gas
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
55 Essential oils and perfume materials
56 Fertilizers, manufactured
57 Explosives and pyrotechnic products
58 Plastic materials, generated cellulose and artificial
resins
59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.
61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s. and dressed
fur skins
62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
63 Wood and cork manufactures (excluding furniture)
64 Paper, paper board and manufactures thereof
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles and related
products
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s.
67 Iron and steel
69 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s.
71 Machinery, other than electric
72 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances
73 Transport equipment
81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and
fittings
82 Furniture
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar articles
84 Clothing
85 Footwear
86 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments,
photographic and optical goods, watches and clocks
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.
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Source : UN [19 74] .23
35. Comparative advantages are, as the empirical evidence also shows, subject to changes
as time passes [see Banerji, Donges 1972; Balassa 1977] . As developing countries move to
higher stages of industrialization, as their demand for capital and intermediate goods in-
creases and the balance-of-payments situation improves as a result of increasing export of
products of industries established in earlier stages of industrial development, they can intro-
duce heavy industries also. Introduction of these industries at a very early stage of industri-
alization, however, involves underutilized capacities and lack of competitiveness resulting in
a relative waste of scarce resources especially foreign exchange required for imports of cap-
ital goods. Thus, attempts to establish heavy industries irrespective of comparative advan-
tages reduce welfare. Industrialization based on comparative advantages in developing coun-
tries need not lead to the preservation of their existing industrial and foreign trade structures
as sometimes wrongly believed in these countries. Studies done at the Institut fur Weltwirt-
schaft (IfW) show that such an industrial strategy could enable developing countries to raise
their share in world industrial production approximately to the same level as projected in
FOWE [see Donges 19 75; Stecher 19 77] .
3 6. The success of an industrial strategy oriented towards consumer goods and other light
goods industries in developing countries would, of course, also depend on the degree of free-
dom granted to the imports of these goods into developed countries. Resurgence of protection-
ist forces in these countries in the last few years, especially in those industries in which de-
veloping countries definitely have comparative advantages, does not augur well at present in
this respect. If the developed countries are interested in promoting a better international divi-
sion of labor on the basis of mutual advantages and international cooperation they will have to
open their markets for the products of the Third World more than what has been the case so
far. The resulting problems of structural changes and unemployment in the related industries
in the developed countries will have to be solved by them with the help of a suitable mix of sub-
sidies and reemployment policies [see Fels 1976; Dicke et al. 1976, pp. 120-143; Wolter
1977] .
3 7. The implementation of the developmental strategy underlying the central scenario (X) of
the FOWE model would lead to a balance-of-payments deficit for the resource-poor LDCs (in
2000) amounting to $ 413. 2 billion
1, which is about two and a half times their export earnings
and ten times the net inflow of capital and aid into these countries
2 . This deficit presumes a
corresponding outflow of short-term capital from the developed and resource-rich developing
countries. The FOWE-authors have made some alternative projections in this respect by
changing their assumptions about relative prices, capital and aid flows, import coefficients
and export shares (scenarios D, R and M) as a result of which the estimated deficit of the re-
source-poor countries decreases [pp. 64-69] .
38. All this leads us to presume that the FOWE heavy-industry biased industrialization strat-
egy for LDCs is likely to entail serious negative side-effects. Selection of an industry mix
according to the principle of potential comparative advantages would, on the other hand, enable
the developing countries to achieve a given rate of income growth with a lower rate of invest-
ment than that estimated in FOWE as a precondition for reducing the income gap between the
developed and developing countries. Physical and human capital required per unit of output'as
well as per employee in light industries is generally lower than in heavy industries. There-
fore even if the developing countries are not able to raise as much domestic capital as envis-
1 The structure of this deficit is as follows: debt servicing burden: $ 326. 5 billion; trade defi-
cit: $ 127. 1 billion; long-term capital and aid surplus: $ 40.4 billion.
2 See Leontief et al. [1977, Annex VI, Scenario X] . - According to these figures, the balance-
of-payments deficit of the resource-poor developing countries amounts to $ 466.4 billion but
the total of net trade, net aid and long-term capital flows, and foreign income in the year
2000 comes to $ 413.2 billion. The difference of $ 53.2 billion between these two figures is,
however, not explained in FOWE.24
aged in the FOWE model, they need not fail to attain the growth objective provided they shift
the emphasis from heavy to light industries.
39. Moreover, while the strategy suggested in FOWE, if implemented, would leave a large
number of people unemployed in Asian and African developing countries, recent estimates
(made at the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft) of capital requirements for full employment and
growth in developing market economies in the year 2000 show that full employment in these
countries can be achieved at an investment level of 15. 6 to 18. 3 %, with growth rates of labor
force between 2. 1 and 2. 35 % and of GDP between 5. 2 and 6. 3 % (depending on assumptions
made about their income level and rate of unemployment), provided they choose a suitable
mix of labor-intensive technologies and goods to be produced [Hiemenz 19 77] .
40. Light industries, for instance, can be profitably operated in the small-scale sector, there-
by providing a relatively large scope for the use of labor-intensive techniques and decentralized
industrial production. Large-scale industries tend to be capital intensive and to concentrate in
cities thus aggravating the problems associated with overpopulated urban areas in the develop-
ing countries. In order to avoid these problems more attention will have to be paid to rural in-
dustrialization which creates opportunities for additional employment of seasonal agricultural
labor. Naturally there are industries which can be economically operated only on a large scale
owing to indivisibilities of available production technologies. Further, a particular developing
country can have locational advantages in some heavy industries because of the domestic avail-
ability of related raw materials, skills, markets, etc. In such cases local production is quite
advisable. The emphasis on light industries here is therefore to be viewed in terms of relative
priorities to be assigned to these industries over heavy industries. The evidence gathered from
an analysis of industrialization policies and efforts in 15 country studies carried out recently
at the IfW [see Donges 1976] lends support to the view that a combination of light industries,
labor-intensive technologies and small-scale production is more suitable for employment crea-
tion, income growth and equal distribution of income than a combination of heavy industries,
capital-intensive technologies and large-scale production. It also involves a lower burden on
the balance of payments at early stages of industrialization when the foreign exchange position
is usually tight and permits an easier transition from production for only local markets to
that for exports enabling the country concerned to go over to the next higher stage of indus-
trialization.
41. However, the need for foreign direct investments cannot be eliminated even in the case of
the alternative industrialization strategy suggested above. In order to encourage such invest-
ments in developing countries, efforts will have to be made to minimize political risks for
such investments in these countries. An analysis of the nationalization of foreign property
amounting to about $ 10 billion in some forty developing countries between 1952 and 19 72
showed that nationalization based on political grounds affects further flow of foreign direct
investments into the respective countries negatively [see Agarwal 19 76] . Repeated statements
of developing countries to exercise their right of sovereignty over their resources and an ex-
plicit recognition of this right in the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the Nations
together with their right to nationalize foreign property according to their national laws have
further increased the concern of investors for political risks in the future. Therefore
it appears to be advisable that investing and host countries should evolve a system of multi-
lateral guarantees against political nationalization of foreign investments in order to secure
a smoothly functioning flow of long-term foreign capital across the national boundaries, espe-
cially from the developed into developing countries. So far these guarantees are given on the
basis of bilateral agreements between the nations and involve higher costs than a multilateral
agreement is likely to have [see Juhl 19 76] .
42. The need for multilateral guarantees against political oriented nationalizations in develop-
ing countries has to be viewed especially in light of their investment requirements for explora-
tion and development of ocean mineral resources which are highly capital and technology inten-
sive. The financial and technological capacity of these countries is very limited. If the seabed
mineral resources in their territorial waters are to be efficiently exploited, they will have to
grant mineral rights to foreign investors on attractive terms which might require the establish-
ment of a system of multilateral guarantee.25
3. Pollution and Abatement
43. The basic question raised in FOWE about the pollution emerging from the growth of in-
dustry, transportation, urban agglomeration as well as agricultural output and about the eco-
nomic costs of abating this pollution is concerned with limits to growth which they may set.
The FOWE authors have come to the conclusion that pollution and abatement expenditure are
not expected to "pose an insurmountable barrier for accelerated development" [p. 7] . This
conclusion is based on two empirical findings. First, the estimates of emissions of eight ma-
jor pollutants
1 after their abatement treatment
2 show that pollution can be reduced to manage-
able limits with the help of available abatement technology. Secondly, the estimated costs of
all abatement activities are not likely to exceed 2 % of GDP even in the case of most developed
regions where abatement standards are strictly and fully applied [p. 7]
 3.
44. Developing regions with per capita income of less than $ 700 p. a. are assumed to have no
abatement activities and expenditure (scenario 1). As their income levels rise they too would
divert resources from consumption and investment to pollution abatement activities. The au-
thors of FOWE expect, however, that by the turn of the century only Latin America and the
Middle East will reach a stage where they would be devoting some proportion of their GDP
(0.2 to 0.4 %)and capital stock (1.0 to 2.3 %) to abatement activities. From the estimated
net emission of pollutants like solid waste, particulates and suspended solids it can, there-
fore, be concluded that in absolute terms the developing regions will be more polluted towards
the end of this century than the developed countries [p. 50 sqq. ] . Estimates of absolute amounts
of the net emission of pollutants in different regions, are, however, not compared in FOWE with
the natural capacities ofithese regions to absorb pollution without endangering the environment
so that nothing can be inferred about the quality of environment available by that time in the
developed countries with relatively more abatement expenditure compared with that in the de-
veloping countries with less or no abatement expenditure.
45. The FOWE authors had to make their projections of pollution and abatement under the
constraint of only sparsely available relevant data for developing as well as developed coun-
tries except the United States of America. So they have generally relied on the United States
data, assuming that the gross emissions of pollutants per unit of output in different industrial
sectors would be the same across the regions and that input requirements per unit of each
abatement process are uniform throughout the world. Four abatement scenarios are used in
the FOWE model assuming further that the United States 19 70 abatement standards are applied,
the degree of which is determined by the level of per capita GDP of the regions
4. These scen-
arios are, as the authors themselves candidly point out, "highly speculative" [p. 50] .
1 The eight pollutants are: particulates, biological oxygen, nitrogen (water), phosphates,
suspended solids, dissolved solids, solid wastes and pesticides.
2 Except in the case of pesticides, which are not covered under 19 70 standards of abatements
in the United States and where no information on the costs of their abatement was available
to the FOWE authors [Leontief et al. 19 77, p. 49] .
3 Cost estimates of the abatement of major particulate air pollution, primary, secondary and
tertiary treatment of water pollution, and land filling or incineration of urban solid wastes
in FOWE vary between 0. 2 and 0. 9 % of GDP and the share of capital stock of the abatement
sector in total capital stock between 0. 9 and 3.9% depending on the region, its per capita
income and abatement standards applied. However, these estimates do not cover all forms
of pollution and abatement and the FOWE authors maintain that the abatement activities
covered by them account for about 35 to 45 % of the total costs of all abatement expenditure
[p. 7 and 52 sqq.] .
4 Regions with per capita income of more than $ 700 but less than $ 2 000 are supposed to ap-
ply half the abatement standards practised in the United States in 1970 (scenario 2). In re-
gions with current per capita income over $ 2 000 but less than that in the previous period
the same proportion of abatement standards is applied as in the United States in 19 70 (scen-
ario 3) and finally the fourth scenario includes regions with per capita income of more than
$ 2 000 in the current as well as previous period. In this scenario the net emission is held
constant at the level of the first year when full abatement standards of the United States were
applied.26
46. Although it would hardly seem worthwhile to explicitly deal with forecasts labeled by the
authors themselves as being "highly speculative," it does seem necessary to direct the read-
ers' attention to some possible weaknesses of their approach. First of all, while the authors
of FOWE went to great lengths to calculate regional pollution patterns, even taking into ac-
count industrial structure differences, they failed to take scale differentials into account. For
example, a country in which a major part of industrial production originates in the small-,
scale sector is likely to have a lower pollution level than a country whose industrial produc-
tion is concentrated in the large-scale sector. Moreover, production technologies in two re-
gions at the same income level but in different periods of time, especially when the difference
between these periods stretches over decades as in FOWE, are not likely to be the same; i.e.,
production technologies to be transferred to a developing country, for example, in the year
2000 are not going to be as pollutive as those applied in the transferring developed country in
1971 when its income level might have been the same as that of the technology-importing de-
veloping country in 2000 [see Schatz 19 76; Giersch (Ed. ) 19 74] . The fact that elsewhere in
FOWE it is assumed that substantial transfers of technology from developed to developing
countries would have to take place if the industrialization of the order of magnitudes involved
in the study is to be realized [p. 63], would also coincide with this contention.
4. International Trade
47. In view of the important role international trade plays in the process of economic growth
not only in developed countries but also (and especially) in countries at an early development
stage, the study's projections of international trade flows merit particular attention. The au-
thors of FOWE are well aware of this importance and incorporate - as mentioned earlier -
both trade flows and capital movements as the basic mechanism, by which the 15 regional in-
put-output-systems are linked.
48. Beginning with the structure of world trade in 1970, projected trade flows are not deter-
mined by changes in the relative competitiveness of a region, but rather by assuming that
- given the level of income and the structure of the economy - exports of a particular com-
modity from one region to the world represent a constant share of total world exports of this
commodity, while the imported quantities of this commodity are fixed shares of the region's
consumption. Thus the regions' output and the regional components of global input determine
the internal input-output balances of each of the trading regions. These "trade-coefficients"
then are applied to any change in regional inputs and outputs (of internationally traded goods);
the result is a change in the respective region' s foreign trade pattern, which simply means
that each region' s exported and imported quantities are not only related but also determined
by its sectoral input-output structure.
49. At least as important as traded quantities is the question of projected future values of im-
ports and exports, which requires the determination of prices and income. Since in the model
framework applied, the technical input-output coefficients (and their change over time) govern
relative prices between various goods on the one hand and wages and profits (value added) of
various industries on the other, it is principally possible either to determine the value added
(at a given price) of a particular industry or the price of its product (at given value added).
Starting from the appropriate price/value-added relations, product prices can be computed;
this has been done for developed regions, at first incorporating expected changes in technical
input coefficients. Prices of internationally traded goods which have been estimated and pro-
jected in this way, reflecting economic conditions prevailing in industrialized countries, have
then been inserted in the respective price/value-added relations of developing countries; tech-
nology and resource endowment of the different regions - via differences in technical coeffi-
cients - affect the respective price/value-added relations.
50. As to the expected changes in technical input coefficients which will be reflected by changes
in relative prices, the FOWE study has assumed the following prospective lines in development:
(1) In the industrialized countries the prices of various raw material inputs are assumed to rise27
sharply, since the depletion of known and accessible resources will induce higher capital re-
quirements of primary extractive industries [p. 65]; (2) in developing countries, which are
richly endowed with natural resources, raw material extracting industries will realize higher
profits than comparable activities in developed countries; (3) as regards the manufacturing
sector of developing countries the authors assume a low - in many activities even negative -
value added.
51. The projections of the regions' balances of trade, based on estimated quantities for ex-
ports, imports and prices, have been computed in current prices. Within the model
1 s frame-
work these regional trade balances are treated either as a given variable with the respective
GNP being unknown, or vice versa. Having, for example, numerically fixed a GNP target
value for developing countries (areas) it is then possible to determine the import surplus
needed under certain prevailing economic conditions to achieve this target. Any deficit, how-
ever, which would accrue in the balance of payments if goods were priced at the market level
may be offset by an increase in export prices of developing countries, and/or financial trans-
actions.
52. These characteristics of the methods used pose several major limitations to the model's
ability (a) to realistically forecast trade figures and (b) to serve as an appropriate tool to
analyse long-run trade patterns reflecting changes in the international (interregional) division
of labor. Before proceeding to scrutinize these two issues first of all a few numerical results
of the projections will be presented.
53. In its most favorable set of conditions (scenario X) the volume of world trade is expected
to increase with an annual rate of 5. 2 %, which is slightly above the growth rate of world gross
product (4. 8 %). It is projected that in the year 2000 about 14. 5 % of world gross product would i
cross national (regional) borders as compared to 10. 6 % in 19 70. A particularly rapid expan-
sion of trade is estimated for manufactured exports (7 % annually), while trade in agricultural
products and in mineral resources is projected to be less than average (2.9 % and 5 % respec-
tively p. a. ).
54. Parallel to the developing market regions' increased share of world gross product (1970:
11 %; 2000: 22 %), these regions - according to the model' s projections - will manage to in-
crease their export share of mineral resources, light industry, machinery and industrial ma-
terials considerably (see Table 13). The share of developing countries' total manufactured ex-
Table 13 - Regional Structure of Exports and Imports















































































































































Source: Leontief et al. [1977, Tables 49, 51, pp. 56, 57].28
ports in world manufactured exports will rise from 8. 9 % (1970) to 12. 5 % in the year 2000,
the respective annual growth rate for this period being 5.6%.
An acceleration of growth (industrialization) in the developing regions is clearly reflected in
their rapidly growing import requirements, leading to an increasing share of developing coun-
tries in world imports from 16.4 % (1970) to 31.4 % (2000), above average increases are
realized in the categories agricultural commodities, industrial materials, machinery and
equipment. Depending on the region, the share of manufactured imports varies from 60 to
85 %, of which (in all regions) machinery and equipment is the largest. With the exception
of light industry products (in the case of only one region, low-income Africa), all develop-
ing regions in all sub-categories of manufactured products remain net-importers.
55. As to the balance-of-payments position of various regions the study offers different alter-
natives. While all quantities in the model have been measured in constant prices of 1970,
traded goods in the balance of payments are valued in current prices, assuming changes in
relative product prices for 1980, 1990 and 2000. In order not to overload the presentation of
projected results with too many (confusing) details the discussion will be confined to sketch-
ing the main lines of changes in the regional balance-of-payments
1 positions rather than prov-
iding numerical evidence
1.
56. As to the impact of changes in relative prices on balance of trade results, attention should
be given to the technique applied in order to get some idea about the proximity of the projec-
tions to reality. Within the given methodological framework, a determination of relative prices
for goods involves the solution of the "dual of the input-output-system, given the technologies
and the value-added proportions" of the respective reference years [p. 65] . Changes in rela-
tive prices - defined in this system - are nothing else but expected shifts in labor productivity,
technique of production and resource costs. While, as a first approximation, such a procedure
seems to be acceptable, it is too much of a simplification to apply this technique to the most
developed region (North America) - as the authors of FOWE have done - and to assume that
these regional projected price changes would be representative of price changes prevailing in
world trade. From an economist
1 s point of view, for whom patterns of the international divi-
sion of labor and hence trade flows are a reflection of internationally different developments
of relative prices over time, this is an altogether unsatisfactory approach. Another major
weakness of the study (admitted by the authors), having strong implications for the allocation
issue, has to be seen in the fact - as mentioned earlier - that though the model assumes auto-
nomous substitution of inputs with changing technology and supply conditions, there has been
no effort to measure effects of price changes on the choice of competing technologies and sub-
stitutes.
57. There have been three alternative assumptions with regard to these exogenously deter-
mined price changes: (1) prices in world trade would change in accordance with relative price
movements computed within the model; (2) prices of 1970 would generally prevail, but there
would be a 3. 5-fold increase in the price of petroleum; (3) the implementation of commodity
schemes - being presently a matter of international negotiations - results in substantial rela-
tive price increases for some of the agricultural and mineral primary commodities; (4) alter-
natives (1) to (3) are assumed to prevail at the same time.
1 To start with, it should be borne in mind that FOWE
1 s computations - as "regards balance-
of-payments results" - only present what one might call "first round effects." Supposing the
balance of trade in any given year is more (less) favorable to a particular region, this will
have implications on future foreign debt and interest payments; these will be lower (higher)
than originally calculated [pp. 66-67] .29
The broad lines of these results can be stated as follows:
(1) Changes in prices are gradual; net differences for the trade balances are not large
(1980); by 1990 substantial deficits emerge in high-income regions. Likewise unfavorable
is the development in some developing regions (medium-income Latin America, low-in-
come Asia) while additional net export revenues are achieved by the mineral exporting re-
gions.
(2) The trade position of the developing countries as a whole would be improved considerably.
Petroleum-importing regions' trade balance deteriorates, resulting in large deficits.
(3) Significant reduction in developed regions' total deficit; the largest beneficiaries would
be the two Latin American regions, tropical Africa and low-income Asia. The cumulated
effect of commodity price increases is smaller than in (2).
(4) The main beneficiaries are still the oil-exporting region and tropical Africa, the other
developing regions' position being somewhat improved as compared to (1).
58. The description of the model as regards the trade flow issue, has led to a sceptical a
priori assessment of its ability to reasonably estimate future trends and realistically predict
changes in the international division of labor. In substantiating this contention, first of all,
the economic implications accruing from model-specific factors will be discussed. Further-
more, the projected results are then - wherever possible - contrasted with alternative pro-
jections or at least with some economic plausibility considerations which might serve as a
kind of reference system.
The technical complexity of the FOWE model as well as the authors' meticulous simulation
of alternative sets of assumptions in many respects exceeds previous global models without,
however, at the same time improving the extent to which these approaches are able to pro-
duce plausible results. Some examples of model-inherent attributes and assumptions have
already been elaborated on before. These essentially concern the study' s failure to include
foreign trade as a major determinant of the future division of labor within the world economy.
Consequently it is not only impossible to use the model as a tool for explaining the present
pattern of regional specialization but also for predicting future trends. These methodological
constraints can briefly be summarized as follows:
- Regional import and export projections in the model are based on the hypothetical assump-
tion of constant prices (1970); changes in relative prices, due, for instance, to interregional
differences in inflation rates (including exchange rate changes), are incorporated only for the
purpose of setting up regional trade balances and do not have an impact on allocation deci-
sions
1. Allocation is determined by the structure of demand and supply - a function of the
income level. Thus the world depicted does not account for a continuation of the manifold
integration developments which have already occurred over the last years, let alone any
attempts to accelerate this process in the future
2 .
- Another constraint of the model has to be seen in the way the authors of FOWE have linked
the domestic sector with the respective trade flows. Although the extent to which any econ-
omy as a whole and the producing sectors in particular imports (exports) goods is essentially
a function of the competitive position of this economy (and its sectors), the model is equipped
with so-called "trade-coefficients." Their application is equivalent to assuming that the de-
velopment of the future import content of inputs does not differ from the past trend. What in
the real world is actually imported, however, is determined by the development of domestic
demand and foreign and domestic prices.
Keeping these constraints in mind the question of whether the projections of exports, imports
and trade balances are at least (incidentally) plausible in their order of magnitude needs to be
examined, i.e., compared with plausibility considerations as well as other projections carried
1 This seems to be a weakness of other global models as well: see Schatz [19 77, p. 5] .
2 Strange as it might seem the FOWE authors consider the noninclusion of the impact of rela-
tive prices as a factor determining allocation to be an advantage [p. 16] .30
out, for example, by the Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft and the World Bank. Needless to say, an
evaluation of the relevance of these projections requires an examination of theoretical as-
sumptions and an implicit assessment of the probability of changes in prevailing economic-
political conditions as well
1. As to the overall results of the FOWE model, projected annual
growth rates of 9. 1 % for developing regions' manufactured exports and of 5. 6 % for total ex-
ports, are significantly lower than the respective figures of the IBRD and IfW projections; this
holds especially for manufactures
2 , for which alternative growth rates ranging from 12. 7 to
15.3 % have been estimated.
These differences rest on diverging assessments with respect to how successful developing
countries (regions) will be in accelerating their process of economic growth. In the FOWE
model the industrialization process would seem to be biased by the 19 70 parameters (adjust-
ed for income levels), which could well reflect the inward-looking policy of import-substitu-
tion. It also seems, however, as if the authors favor heavy-industry biased import substitu-
tions as a promising avenue for industrialization being able not only to secure enduring growth
impulses but also to mitigate balance-of-payments problems in developing countries [p. 68] .
Empirical evidence so far, however, does not lend much support to this contention; on the
contrary, the pursuing of import-substituting activities, without regard to the comparative
advantages of a country, has proved to create substantial limitations for long-term growth
prospects, the most important of them being the establishment of inefficient plants and of an
inefficient industrial structure, thereby postponing the time of a reorientation of policies once
the limits of an inward-looking strategy have been reached [Little, Scitovsky, Scott 19 70,
pp. 80 sqq. ; Donges 19 76, pp. 629 sqq. ] .















































Source: Leontief et al. [1977, Annex VI] ; IBRD [19 77, Table VI, 1] .
1 A comparison of the FOWE results with alternative projections (Tables 14 and 15) meets sev-
eral difficulties. First of all, annual growth rates of projected exports for primary commodi-
ties and fuels could not be calculated, since the published FOWE material provides only pro-
duction and net exports. Second, since FOWE does not allow for any bilateral (biregional)
trade flows, the impact of bilateral liberalization of exports cannot be determined. Third,
time horizons of the projections differ.
2 It has to be borne in mind that the IfW projection has been based on a limited sample re-
presenting about 80 % of all developing countries' manufactured exports.31


























































aNo FOWE projection available. -





















Source: IBRD [1977, p. 45 and p. 151]; Leontief et al. [1977, Annex VI]; Donges, Riedel
[1977, Table 4, pp. 58 sqq. ]
Compared with alternative calculations which have been based on past successes, FOWE' s
projection of export growth seems quite pessimistic. Two such alternative estimates are
presented here (Table 15). These reveal that the international pattern of comparative advan-
tage has rapidly changed during the past two decades: Developing countries are supplying a
wide and ever expanding range of manufactured products, while in many developed countries
output and thus employment are declining in formerly traditional industrial sectors. This pro-
cess of restructuring of the world economy can be expected to continue in the future securing
a probable export growth rate for manufactures from LDCs of nearly 13 % in real terms
(Table 15). Such an acceleration of manufactured exports will, on the one hand, be required,
since the need of creating productive employment for the increased population of LDCs implies
significant importation of intermediate products and capital goods, to be paid for mainly by ex-
ports. On the other hand, the export acceleration is feasible because more and more LDCs are
making headway in their industrialization process up to the stage at which their manufacturing
sector becomes internationally competitive. The IBRD and the IfW estimations have been based
on the status quo assumption that there will be no improvements in international trade policy
framework, e.g., tariff cuts, relaxation of non-tariff barriers in developed countries, re-
duction of discrimination against exports, diminishing of import protection and exchange rate
adjustments in developing countries [IBRD 19 77, p. 45] . In spite of these somewhat "restric-
tive" assumptions the projected growth rates show that overall growth of exports exceeds the
1968-1973 growth by about 2 %, probably as a result of a continued diversification of exports
as well as expansion of intra-developing country trade. These status quo results as well as
the projections of the IfW (also based on trend extrapolation) no doubt have to be considered
as "minimum figures." This "minimum" is considered to hold even in light of the develop-
ments after 1973, i.e., as a consequence of the quadrupling of the oil price; it is assumed
namely that future improvements in trade policy will at least offset such possible growth-
dampening effects.32
59. Judging from past experiences, prospects for improving overall trade policy conditions
do not seem to be promising. It is true that the trading system both in developed and devel-
oping countries has been liberalized during the last 15 to 20 years: Trade regimes in some
developing countries have been partly liberalized and sizeable tariff cuts took place in the
OECD countries. But it is also true that the industrial countries are now facing mounting
protectionist pressures from within
1. To the extent that the pressure groups succeed, the
prospects for a harmonious development of the world economy becomes open to question. Not
only will the spread of import restrictions for the benefit of noncompetitive industries reduce
the scope of expansion of the internationally competitive and dynamic branches by absorbing
too many scarce resources. The violation of the hitherto agreed and observed rules of inter-
national trade may increase economic uncertainty to a point where long-term investment grows
at a substantially slower rate than it otherwise would. Whether governments of these countries
will be able to effectively resist such pressures, thus making a breakthrough in the current
GATT trade negotiations still remains to be seen. Much will depend on their ability to explain
organized groups that further reductions in trade barriers will generate important net benefits
in terms of additional economic growth, higher real incomes, less monopoly power in product
markets and better inflation control.
60. Although it would not be realistic to assume that remaining protection will be completely
dismantled by 2000, there is surely a definite range for further liberalization of trade be-
tween developed and developing as well as in trade between developing countries. This would
encompass both tariff reductions and a dismantling of non-tariff barries. In the past GATT
negotiations have been mainly centered around the reduction or elimination of import barriers
for those products of interest to industrialized countries - be they imports or exports. This
is the consequence of the principle of reciprocity, i.e., a balanced exchange of concessions
among the negotiating countries, which governed the various GATT rounds. As LDCs were
not prepared or able to provide concessions, they could not gain much, at least until the Ken-
nedy Round in which for the first time these countries were allowed to participate on a less
than full reciprocal basis. Liberalization consequently took place in fields of activity where
developing countries' competitiveness and thus interest was still relatively limited. It is,
therefore, not surprising to find that manufactures from developing countries with substantial
export potential are either hit by high effective tariffs and quotas or by several so-called
"voluntary" export restraints (the so-called "orderly marketing agreements").
61. The General Systems of Preferences for manufactures from LDCs was expected to im-
prove the access to industrial countries' markets. However, the regulations agreed upon so
far are incomplete, since they are - generally speaking - more generous the less competitive
the developing countries' export goods are and the more inelastic the export supply is. It can-
not be overlooked that a number of manufactures of special export interest to developing coun-
tries (in particular textiles, leather goods, footwear, petroleum products) are still restricted
on the import market of one or more liberalizing countries. The schemes of the EEC, Japan
and the United States embody restrictive ceilings for preferential imports. The recent enlarge-
ment of the EEC, the concomitant free trade area agreement between the European Community
and the rest of the EFTA members, and the association arrangement with Mediterranean coun-
tries (de facto) have resulted in intra-west European trade creation and, hence, substantially
eroded the value of the EEC system of generalized tariff preferences. Imports from develop-
ing countries which proved to be competitive in developed countries' markets, however, sub-
stantially exceeded the ceilings and the expansion of these imports was always ahead of in-
creases in the respective ceilings. This means that developing countries have to surmount
tariff barriers, if they want to increase the export of manufactures along the lines of present
comparative advantages. It also means that LDCs would be better off in the last resort if they
ask for substantial tariff cuts on a most-favoured-nation basis than opposing them on grounds
of an erosion of the margins of preferences they are enjoying
2 .
1 For a detailed discussion of the sources of these pressures see Blackhurst, Marian, Tumlir
[1977].
2 For detailed calculations see Baldwin, Murray [1977] .33
62. In view of these aspects it would seem fairly realistic to expect further liberalization ef-
forts to induce a more dynamic rate of export growth. The World Bank has tried to quantify
potential gains in exports of manufactures accruing from (a) an expected partial relaxation of
nontariff barriers and tariff-cuts (Tokyo-Round) and from (b) an assumed improvement of
trade policies in developing countries. The Bank's estimates [IBRD 1977, p. 49] reveal an
acceleration of export growth of about 3 % annually for both sources taken together (see Ta-
ble 15), of which the larger effects are attributed to potential improvements of trade policies
in developing countries (approx. 2 %). International trade policy changes are not only expected
to lead to increases in trade between developing and developed but also to intensified relations
among developing countries
1.
63. As to the potential welfare and export gains of the multilateral trade negotiations men-
tioned above (Tokyo-Round), there are some quantitative estimates available which recently
have been conducted by the Brookings Institution [Cline et al. 19 76] and which perhaps might
serve as a guideline for "optimizing" negotiations. According to these calculations, which
have been carried out assuming alternative outcome of negotiations (twelve different tariff
cutting formulas, including one which completely eliminates tariffs to give a benchmark-es-
timate for the effects of free trade) it can be expected that welfare gains to consumers in in-
dustrial countries as well as export gains to developing countries could be doubled, if, in-
stead of adopting the somewhat restrictive tariff cutting formulas now under consideration,
deep cuts in tariffs and nontariff barriers (such as the full U. S. proposals - 60 % cut with
elimination of protection below 5 %) could be realized. The Brookings Study considers the im-
pact of liberalization on labor displacement to be of "inconsequential magnitudes" for the areas
United States, Japan, Canada and the EEC and concludes that any prospective trade balance
losses for individual countries from even the most liberal tariff cuttings would be rather
modest and would not constitute a basis for limiting the extent of liberalization [Cline et al.
1976, pp. 65 sqq. ] .
There is, however, growing interest about the potential benefits of increased trade between
developing countries [Balassa, Stoutjesdijk 1975] because trade between developing countries
seems to have much to offer in the medium and long run; particularly so, as income levels,
tastes and wants, let alone production patterns, are more similar among these countries than
between this group and the highly industrialized nations. The opportunities for gains lie main-
ly in greater specialization which involves increasing both the export-to-output ratios in the
manufacturing sector and the share of manufactured imports in total domestic supply. By in-
tensifying the division of labor between themselves, the developing countries would also be
induced to reduce the (in some cases extreme) product variability in individual firms which
involves a high cost to the national economy. Apart from improvements in resource alloca-
tion, benefits from intra LDC -trade could be derived from further economies of scale, for
actual or would-be exporters would have access to wider markets which are better known to
them and less risky and uncertain than the markets in industrial countries. By penetrating the
neighboring markets, firms would be prepared to face competition in world markets at a later
stage. Finally, increased trade between developing countries would expose domestic producers
to more competition, thus providing inducements for productivity improvements and moderniza-
tion of the industrial apparatus.
64. The explanation for the FOWE study not having taken into account the potential of division
of labor between developing countries could be two-fold. On the one hand, the aggregation of
developing countries into regions does not allow to explicitly analyze trade flows within such
regions. On the other hand, the low degree of intra-LDC-trade and the fact that this trade has
shrunk over the years, may have suggested to the team that this is a 'quantite negligeable. '
And experience made with various attempts of institutionalized economic integration between
developing countries (e. g. , free trade areas, common markets in Latin America, customs
and economic unions in Africa) seems not to be very encouraging.
1 Unfortunately FOWE's trade projections - due to the methodological shortcomings, men-
tioned above - do not provide biregional trade figures thus making any comparison of changes
in the structure of origin and destination of traded goods impossible.34
65. Whatever the case, the intra-LDC-trade patterns of the past are not necessarily the
adequate guide to what may happen in the future. As developing countries are determined
to further accelerate industrialization of their economies, they will have to seek closer eco-
nomic integration among themselves. Import substitution alone would not provide for sus-
tained growth; and export expansion into industrial countries' markets alone would be diffi-
cult to achieve for many less advanced developing countries due to both the lack of market-
ing capabilities and the inability of meeting specific quality standards. The case for in-
creased intra-LDC-trade will be stronger the slower trade liberalization in industrial coun-
tries proceeds. As a matter of fact, manufactured exports from several developing countries
went largely to other developing countries in recent years. In order to intensify this process,
certain trade policies may be necessary including a gradual reduction of their own import
protection - allowing developing countries at lower levels of development to reduce at a
slower rate in order to avoid various dislocations in their existing industries caused by in-
creased competition from the more advanced LDCs - and an exchange rate policy that avoids
currency overvaluations.
The above presentation of alternative estimates for future export developments has lent sup-
port to the scepticism with which FOWE' s assumptions were viewed. Although there is ad-
mittedly uncertainty surrounding the IBRD and IfW estimates, the overall probability of as-
sumptions underlying the IBRD and IfW estimates would seem to be higher; this, of course,
does not necessarily mean that these guesstimates will actually take place but rather that
they are at least in the right direction. The extent to which they can be realized will be
severely influenced by the future general growth conditions resulting from the current negotia-
tions about the "New International Economic Order." FOWE mentions this issue but does not
tackle this highly crucial problem; it simply confines its approach to a scenario in which rela-
tive prices for natural resources are increased, thereby calculating the possibilities of reduc-
ing the balance-of-payments deficit for developing regions by increased export earnings of
primary commodities.
66. This commodity issue, however, is economically far more complex. A realization of the
developing countries' demand for a reorganization of the international commodity trade along
UNCTAD
1 s lines which aims at stabilizing and raising prices to "just and remunerative" levels
by concluding international commodity agreements or producer cartels would most probably re-
sult in a fundamental change of growth conditions for the world economy as a whole. On the one
hand, there will be an artificial stimulation of commodity production in LDCs and hence a slower
diversification of their economies would then be desirable under overall development aspects. On
the other hand, industrial countries might direct more resources than they otherwise would into
the production of own primary commodities (even at higher costs) or the development of new
substitutes, let alone the danger that a worldwide regulation of commodity markets may play
in the hands of protectionist pressure groups in the industrial countries and that commodity
overpricing creates additional adjustment pressures in developed countries, thereby reducing
economic growth and narrowing the potential capital investment flowing to the developing coun-
tries' manufacturing sector [Baron, Glismann, Stecher 1977; Glismann, Stecher 1977]. It is
difficult to revise the FOWE forecasts to account for such happenings without revising the
whole model. It nonetheless seems probable that the prospects of LDCs accelerating indus-
trialization and expanding manufactured exports would be shifted in an upward direction, as
would also be the case for the predicted growth rates for industrial countries.35
III. Summary and Concluding Remarks
67. As stated at the outset of this appraisal the authors of FOWE conclude that there are no
physical limits in the world which would prevent the per capita income gap between developed
and developing countries from being reduced from 12 : 1 in 19 70 to 7 : 1 by the year 2000.
The limits instead are imposed by inflexibilities in the existing world economic order as well
as by economic, social and political institutions in developing countries. In light of the fact
that most economists never really believed in the global doomsday predictions anyhow, the
usefulness of a study which - despite its complexity - ends with common knowledge must be
questioned. An attempt to delineate the changes in world economic order as well as in institu-
tions in developing countries, which are considered by the FOWE authors as preconditions for
accelerated economic growth envisaged in their model, could probably have made the entire
exercise more useful. By failing to specify what changes in institutional order in developing
countries and in world economic order the FOWE authors had in mind, they have led the
reader into the realm of speculation about the plausibility of their quantitative as well as
qualitative conclusions.
68. Insofar as the model underlying FOWE is concerned, the preceding appraisal has shown
that it suffers from some important weaknesses. Some of them are inherently related with
the limitations of input-output analysis used in the model as an instrument of long-run fore-
casting for the world economy consisting of very heterogeneous countries. Others are to be
sought in the application of this analytical tool by the FOWE authors as well as in availability
and selection of data. The attention in FOWE is focussed on developing countries and it is true
that statistical data for these countries are only sparsely available, but the FOWE authors do
not appear to have made enough efforts to make use of even those data which are relatively
easily available. Instead they have relied on the surrogation of data for these countries from
the statistics of developed countries which could have negatively effected the results
1.
69. As far as the empirical results in FOWE are concerned, it is important to note that al-
though the FOWE authors find reserves of most of the mineral resources to be adequate for
the stipulated economic growth in developed and developing countries, they proceed in a simi-
lar manner as in other global models in assuming that known reserves in essence represent
potential reserves. It is, therefore, not surprising to discover that in FOWE those minerals
with relatively small supplies of known reserves are predicted to run out before the turn of
the century. Such results could have been avoided if adequate allowance had been made for
market forces to react and cause supply and/or demand parameters to change. It is also
shown that an increasing demand for nutritional resources due to higher incomes, increased
population and nutritional improvement can be easily met, provided the developing regions
are able to carry out land reforms as well as social and institutional changes for overcoming
nontechnological barriers to increased use of land and productivity. FOWE refrains, however,
from specifying the changes required in the developing regions for increased agricultural
production.
70. An acceleration of industrialization of developing regions is expected in FOWE to serve
as an engine of their proposed high rates of economic growth, whereby particular stress is
placed on the growth of heavy industries. Rapid industrialization is seen as leading to a consid-
erable rise in the share of industrial production in total output and of capital and intermediate
goods in total industrial output. The developing regions are thus supposed to tread the devel-
opment path followed by the developed countries. It would enable them according to the numer-
ical solutions of the FOWE model to raise their share in world manufacturing output from 6 %
(1970) to 17. 5 % (2000), whereas the share of the developed market economy countries is es-
timated to fall from 70 % (1970) to 49 % (2000).
1 Further, editing in FOWE leaves much to be desired. Some of the tables in scenario analyses
are not consistent with the annex tables arid explanations for these inconsistencies are miss-
ing.36
71. The emphasis on heavy industries proposed in FOWE is, however, not the appropriate
development strategy. The experience of developing countries in the past 20 to 30 years shows
that an industrialization oriented towards heavy industries has aggravated the problems of un-
employment, income inequality and balance-of-payments deficits rather than solving them.
Introduction of heavy industries at an early stage of industrialization involves underutilized
capacities, low levels of productivity and a relatively high import intensity. A suitable eco-
nomic development strategy for developing countries means that the balance between light and
heavy industries, small and large-scale industries, domestic and foreign investments, capital
and labor-intensive technologies, rural and urban development must be chosen.
72. Such a balance can be better realized if the industry mix is oriented towards potential
comparative advantages of the country concerned. At an early stage of industrialization these
advantages are likely to be found in light industries which are labor intensive and/or raw ma-
terial intensive. As a country moves towards higher stages of industrialization it can also in-
troduce heavy industries, because by that time its demand for their products would have in-
creased and its balance-of-payments situation improved as a result of increasing exports of
products of industries established at earlier stages of industrialization. Industrialization of
developing countries based on their comparative advantages need not lead to the preservation
of their existing industrial and foreign trade structures or their present share in world indus-
trial production. On the contrary, estimates from various sources show that such a policy for
developing countries could lead to a considerable improvement in these respects.
73. Since light industries are usually less capital intensive than heavy industries, they could
enable the developing countries to achieve the high rates of growth of industrial production
proposed in FOWE with lower capital requirements. As a matter of fact it is disputed that
the capital requirements forecasted in FOWE can be raised in the LDCs by depending on do-
mestic sources (i.e. , at the expense of consumption) in light of limitations imposed by the
low levels of income. Thus shifting the emphasis of development strategies from heavy to
light industries could enable them to attain the given growth objectives even if they fail to
raise as much domestic financial resources as projected in FOWE. Establishment of light
industries is also more suitable with respect to improving the income distribution and reduc-
ing unemployment in developing countries.
74. The success of an industrial strategy oriented towards light industries in developing coun-
tries also depends on the degree of market accessibility granted to the exports of their prod-
ucts to developed countries. If the developed countries are sincerely interested in improving
an international division of labor between themselves and the developing countries on the basis
of mutual advantages and international cooperation, they will have to open their markets for
the products of the Third World more than in the past.
75. The burden on domestic resources in developing countries resulting from financing the
accelerated rate of investment can be reduced by encouraging the inflow of foreign private in-
vestment for which an essential precondition is the minimization of political risks for these
investments. This can be achieved by introducing a system of multilateral guarantees against
political nationalization of foreign property. So far these guarantees are given on the basis of
bilateral agreements between nations and involve higher costs than a multilateral system is
likely to cause. Developing countries should also avail themselves of the opportunity to grant
foreign investors access to their environmental resources as long as such activities do not
result in an endangering of the environment. Presently these countries either have few pollu-
tion problems, and those they have are related more to poverty or to agglomeration disecon-
omies than to industrialization.
76. It has been pointed out that the resource-poor developing regions are going to have a for-
eign exchange deficit of more than $ 400 billion by the end of this century if they follow the de-
velopment strategy evolved in FOWE. The optimism of the authors of FOWE that a deficit of
this order of magnitude can be financed by augmenting the flow of aid and/or short-term capi-
tal from the developed and resource-rich regions cannot be shared. A better solution, i.e.,37
one which also mitigates balance-of-payments problems of such proportions, can be achieved
by following a two-pronged development strategy. On the one hand efforts should be made to
encourage those productive activities which require comparatively lesser amounts of imported
inputs of capital and intermediate goods as well as'raw naaterials so that the demand for for-
eign exchange is minimized without endangering economic growth. On the other hand, measures
to encourage exports of domestic products have to be carefully selected and implemented to in-
crease foreign exchange earnings. The experience of natural resource-poor countries like
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan has shown that such a development strategy can
be successful in solving balance-of-payments problems as well as in achieving a relatively high
rate of economic growth in a reasonable time period.
77. In concluding this appraisal it must be underlined that although the authors of FOWE admit
to many of the weaknesses of their model and analysis, - they even concede (in the preface)
that their model is not a finished piece of work -, they still felt that their model would "prov-
ide the basis for continuing contributions to the quantitative analysis of the world economy" [p. 2].
To lend credence to this contention it would have at least been necessary to run the model back-
wards to 19 60 or 1950
1. However, in lieu of empirical substantiation of the model' s capabilities
and in light of the above criticism, it does not appear that a world model of this kind can prove
to be the useful tool for economic analysis as envisaged by the authors. As a matter of fact it
would be "grossly irresponsible if ... global strategies for development were accepted simply
because they appear to have been authenticated by a method of calculation" [S. Cole 19 77,
p. 116] . Policy makers both in developing and developed countries would seem to stand to
gain more from a piecemeal approach, i.e., from studies carried out in great depth and detail
taking into account as many characteristics of the countries as possible.
For a dramatic example of what can happen see, for instance, H.S.D. Cole, Curnow[1973,
pp. 112-113] : "One obvious thing to investigate ... is what the [World Dynamics] model has
to say about the period before [the model, i.e., before 1900] .... the credibility of the fu-
tures portrayed by the models rests on their ability to reproduce to a plausible degree his-
torical trends . . . As it stands [the model] World 2 will not run backwards from 1900 for
more than a little over 20 years . . . [After] running the model back to 1880 and then for-
wards from that date . . . [curious.curves are produced] - they seem to indicate the 20th
century lies in the aftermath of a catastrophic population collapse [from a previously in-
finite population] ..." ! !Appendix
To cut printing costs the tables have been reproduced directly from the
original manuscript.40





























































































































All trends were estimated with a semilog (exponential
function using moving 3 year averages.
to y = a + bt which
bt
y = a + e
is equivalent
y = commodity production
1000 tons)
t = time period
The coefficients of
at the 95% level.
in mill
to
. tons (except nickel -
all variables were significant at least
Source: Own calculations, based on data from Metallgesellschaft
AG {1977, pp. 56-59}.41
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Source: Own calculations based on FAO {various vols.}.44























































Source : Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems 1975, op. cit., p. 16
Explanation : What is generally referred to as reserves is the area below "demon-
strated" labelled as "economic", often "inferred" is also included. As
prices increase and/or as technology improves identified reserves begin
to encompass those areas designated as subeconomic. At the same time
explorational activities are increased and "undiscovered" resources are
moved in the identified direction (e. g., "hypothetical" becomes "identi-
fied" ).45
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